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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL LEASING COMPANY, 
A Corporation, 




Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 17267 
This case involves an action for alleged conversion on 
the part of Manivest Corporation, the Defendant. Manivest 
Corporation is the landlord · of a parcel of land and the 
building thereon which was rented to a third party, Peck and 
Shaw Fine Cars, Inc .. Peck and Shaw in turn as a tenant leased 
certain air conditioning and heating equipment from the Plaintiff 
and installed the equipment in and on the building owned by 
the Defendant. Peck and Shaw defaulted on their lease with 
the Defendant and vacated the building. The air conditioning 
and heating improvements were left affixed as a part of the 
building when Peck and Shaw vacated the building. .Plaintiff 
brings this action to recover the improvements alleging their 
nature as personal property. Defendant defends this action on 
the basis of the improvements as real property. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This appeal is taken from a granting of a judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff, the Court deciding in the affirmative 
on the issue of the personal property nature of the air condi-
tioning and the heating improvements. The trial was heard on 
Thur.sday, October 15, 1981 in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the lower Court's granting 
on a judgment in the amount of $18,000.00 in favor of the 
Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE' FACTS 
In the late summer of 1977, Peck and Shaw Fine Cars, Inc. 
had its place of business at 5650 South 900 East in Murray, 
Utah. Peck and Shaw leased those premises from Manivest Corpora-
tion on a fifteen (15) year lease commencing in 1971. On 
October 3, 1977, six (6) years after the commencement of the 
lease, Peck and Shaw, desiring to upgrade the building's air 
conditioning and heating, leased from the. Plaintiff new equipment 
(Record p. 66). The leased items consisted of eight (8) large 
commercial evaporative coolers, their supporting sleeve and 
duct work, and a heating CO-RAY-VAC system consisting of multiple 
burners hung along the ce·iling and their supporting pump and 
exhaust systems (Record pp. 68, 201, 205. 228). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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At the time of the lease, General Leasing Company approached 
the landlord, the: Defendant, Manivest Corporation, and requested 
that Manivest execute a landlord waiver. This waiver would 
have relinquished any future claim of right Manivest would have 
had over the leased property. However, Manivest refused to 
execute the waiver (Record pp. 171,172). 
In late January, 1980, Peck and Shaw abandoned the premises 
at 5650 South 900 East, Murray, Utah forfeiting its leasehold 
with Manivest and also defaulting upon the lease payments due 
Plaintiff fo~ the air conditioning and heating equipment installed 
in 1977. At the time of Peck and Shaw's default, there were 
approximately six (6) years left on the landlord-tenant lease 
between Defendant, Manivest Corporation, and Peck and Shaw. 
After Manivest retook possession and control of the premises, 
Plaintiff, General Leasing Company, made demand upon the Defendant 
to return the leased equipment and the Defendant refused to do 
so (Record p. 163). The Defendant, Manivest Corporation, has 
refused to return the equipment on the basis that the heating 
and air conditioning equipment have become fixtures in the 
sense that they are integrally related to the value of the real 
estate. In addition, Plaintiff was well aware that respecting 
the leasing agreement with Peck and Shaw, Defendant had never 
executed a landlord waiver respecting the subject equipment 
(Record p. 189). Furthermore, at all times during the term of 
the leasing arrangement between Peck and Shaw and the Plaintiff, 
the lease could have been accelerated by Plaintiff, General Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Leasing, to recover the equipment had General Leasing deemed itself 
insecure (Record p. 189). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S AWARDOF DAMAGES OF $18,000.00 
ASSln:filS THAT NONE OF THE LEASED EQUIPMENT HAD ASSUMED 
THE CHARACTER OF REAL PROPERTY, WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS AN INCORP.ECT APPLICATION OF LAW. 
The question which must be asked in this law suit is how much 
was the Plaintiff damaged by the alleged conduct of Defendant. 
Assuming, for illustration, that in January of 1980 when Peck and 
Shaw left behind the leased air conditioning and heating equipment, 
that Defendant upon reassuming control of the building, acceded 
to Plaintiff's request and returned everything that Plaintiff 
had leased to Peck and Shaw in 1977. What would that used equip-
ment have been worth? As to this issue, Plaintiff's expert witness 
testified as follows: 
"Q Are-you familiar with the value of used 
equipment in this community of this sort 
of heating and air conditioning equipment? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And do you have an opinion of the value of the 
equipment involved in this case if it were taken 
away from the building and sold as of December 1980? 
A Yes. 
Q What would the value of that be taken away from 
the building? 
A Oh, approximately, I'd say right in the ballpark 
of $18,000." (Record p. 209). 
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Therefore, based upon this testimony, the entire value of 
all of Plaintiff's used equipment was Eighteen Thousand Dollars 
($18,000.00) at the time Plaintiff demanded its return. The 
testimony of Defendant's expert witness amounts to even less. 
Defendant's expert testified that the used heating equipment, 
once returned to Plaintiff, was worth about Sixty Five Hundred 
Dollars ($6,500.00) (Record p. 233). Regarding the used 
cooling equipment, the expert gave no testimony on its value. 
Defendant's expert stated that eight (8) new detached swamp coolers 
were worth Ten Thousand, Four Hundred Dollars ($10,400.00) new 
(Record pp. 234, 235, 228). However, as to their used value, 
he stated as follows: 
" A On most air conditioning installations that 
involved the installation of real property, 
involved duct work and water lines and elec-
trical lines, the value of the total job, 
the material represents probably a half or 
less of the value of the total job, so 
therefore the labor to install used equipment 
is as much or more as it is to install new 
equipment. Wben you look at the total savings 
on,a total installed job, used equipment 
does not look very attractive. And if it's 
over a year old, for instance, you have lost a 
manufacturer's warranty on the equipment. 
Swamp coolers, air conditioners tend to go 
fast. They don't tend to hold up a long time. 
If I were a customer and as a customer 
advising a customer, I would be very reluctant 
to generally advise the installation of a used 
cooling system for those reasons in a building." 
(Record pp. 228,229). 
Furthermore, regarding the duct work and support systems for 
the swamp coolers, Plaintiff's expert testified that such had no 
value in used equipment. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
"Q Now, why is there such a difference between 
the value of the property installed on the 
building and the value if you took it away and 
sold it? 
A Well, the labor, you lose the installed money, 
obviously. You would lose quite a bit of materials. 
Q What type of materials? 
A Duct work, water lines, electrical. 
Q These couldn't be used again? 
--A No. The application, the chances of the application 
being the same somewhere else on the equipment would 
be one in a million. It would just be worth less. 
Then half the time you mess it up trying to save 
it, anyway. It's just not worth the time to 
monkey with it." (Record p. 210). 
Therefore, the most the used equipment could have po_ssibly 
been worth to the Plaintiff is Eighteen Thousand Dollars 
($18,000.00), and that is assuming the Court believed only 
Plaintiff's expert. Therefore, ipso facto, by granting judgment 
in favor of thePlaintiff in the amount of Eighteen Thousand 
Dollars ($18, 000. 00), the Court decide.d that all of the leased 
equipment should have been returned to the Plaintiff and that none 
of it had assumed the character of real property. Therefore, 
any part of the leased prop~rty shown as a clear matter to be 
real property, the value thereof should be subtracted directly 
from the $18,000.00 judgment. 
As to this situation, the leased articles should be broken 
down into their major categories to determine what portions of 
the leased equipment are, as a matter of law, too closely related 
to the real estate so as to become "fixtures". 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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POINT II 
ANALYSIS OF EACH MAJOR CATEGORY OF THE 
LEASED EQUIPMENT ACCORDING TO UTAH LAW 
INDICATES TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY 
APPLY THE LAW OF FIXTURES. 
Utah's law concerning an item as a fixture is well laid 
out in State Road Commission v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 
427 P.2d 749 (1967). The three way test applied is stated by 
the Court as follows: 
"[l) In determining whether or not an item is 
a fixture, the courts usually apply the general 
three-way test, viz., (1) manner in which the 
item is attached or annexed to realty; (2) whether 
the item is adaptable to the particular use of 
the realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor 
to make an item a permanent part of the realty." 
(1) THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ITEM IS ATTACHED OR 
ANNEXED TO THE REALTY. 
The air conditioning system consisted of three (3) 
component parts: 
1) _The bottom discharge coolers on the roof; 
2) The side discharge units for cooling 
individual areas; and 
3) The exhaust fan system. (Record pp. 199-201). 
These components were attached differently to the building in 
question. 
The bottom discharge coolers were situated resting on the 
roof. In comparison to the average sized residential swamp 
cooler, these were huge. According to Plaintiff's expert, they 
were up to six (6) times the capacity of residential coolers. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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In fact, they would require the use of a crane for their 
removal, in conjuction with two (2) men (Record p. 200). 
The side discharge units were fastened to the side of the 
building with several screws, and were often resting on the 
otherpreviou~lyinstalled equipment (Record p. 200, 197). 
These units would also require crane assistance for removal 
from the real property (Record p. 200). 
The exhaust fan system is removable only with considerable 
difficulty (Record p. 201). This is due to the fact that the 
exhaust system is actually part of the roof. Removing the 
exhaust fan system is to remove the roof's flashing thereby 
leaving a gaping hole where removed (Record p. 201). 
Regarding the heating system, it was comprised of burners 
hung to beams in the building. The burners by-product is 
carbon monoxide which is sucked away by exhaust pumps (Record 
p. 202). The exhaust exits through roof flashings which if 
removed would also leave holes in the roof. Furthermore, 
along the string of burners, eight to ten inch square holes were 
left in the walls to accomodate the passage of the system 
(Record p. 204). 
From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the attachment 
element is significant in each of the distinct categories of 
the equipment. Furthermore, it is clear that removal of the 
equipment would cause material injury to the building. Hence, 
attachment in the purely physical sense is sufficient. However, 
the systems ought not only be analyzed as how one thing is 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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attached to another, but also the attachment issue pertains 
to the system as a whole. For instance, each evaporative cooler 
required its own independant duct work, its own hole, and its 
own sleeve (Record p. 228). The duct work was worked into the 
building such that to remove the duct work would have materially 
damaged the structure proper. The situation at bar is similar 
to the fact situation in the case of State Automobile Mutual 
-
Insurance Company vs. E. T. Trautwein, a 1967 Kentucky case. 
The Trautwein case deals with air conditioners mounted in wall 
openings to cool an apartment building. The opinion stated as 
follows: 
"According to this testimony, an opening in the 
wall of each apartment was provided for permanent 
attachment of a sleeve and an air conditioner was 
placed in this sleeve and fastened by screws and a 
rubber seal. The air conditioners were intended 
to remain permanently fixed in place. They could 
not be removed without considerable force and 
probable damage to the sleeves and the sleeves 
couldnot be removed without serious damage to the 
wall. These air conditioners were fixtures and 
part of the building insured by the appellant." 
414 S.W.- 2d 586 at 588 and 589, -(Ken., 1967) 
-- '-
An air conditioning system is, after all, a system. This 
idea of an air conditioning continuum was not lost on the 
Kentucky Court. The Court clearly looked at the removal of the 
air conditioners as damaging the sleeves which in turn damage 
the duct work. Damaging duct work is clearly causing material 
injury to fixtures in the sense of a building's nature as real 
property. The attachment of integral components to one another 
constitutes an entire system that begins with the roof mounted 
, _ __! -- ::_·:-~=~~"=----=-~ ~-=-::-.:3.c.:- ~,::-~_th the air outlets within the building. If 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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It flies in the face of reason to say that the eight machines on 
top of the roof could be disconnected and removed without any 
damage to the value of the system or the value of the realty. 
(2) WERE THE ITEMS ADAPTABLE TO THE PARTICULAR USE 
OF THE REALTY? 
Peck and Shaw sold cars. In that business, one cannot 
expect customer:; to linger without adequate heating and air con-
ditioning equipment. In car showrooms heating and air condition-
ing are not only adaptable but absolutely essential. The Supreme 
Court of Ohio, in the case of Holland Furnace Company vs. Trumble 
Savings and Loan Company, stated as follows: 
"A fixture may be defined as an item of property 
which was a chattel, but which has been so affixed 
to realty for a combined functional use that it has 
become part and parcel of the realty. The combined 
functional use must be of such a character as to 
indicate to all persons dealing with the realty that 
the intention and purpose of the owner of the 
chattel to make the combination a permanent attribute 
of the realty so as to pass in ownership with it." 
19 NE2d 273, Ohio (1939) 
The Court continued by referring to a disputed furnance 
and stated: 
"WC.en installed it certainly became an integral 
and necessary part of the whole premises and 
ordinarily it would not be taken out or dismantled 
until it was worn out by use ... The adaptation of 
the chattel to the permanent use and enjoyment of 
the freehold; the lack of utility of the premises 
if it were severed; and the necessity of replacing 
it with another or similar kind if it were removed 
all indicate that the second test of a fixture. it 
is satisfied in the case of this furnace." 
Id at 275 
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(3) THE INTENTION OF THE ANNEXOR TO MAKE AN ITEM A 
PERMANENT PART OF THE REALTY. 
The intent of the annexor (Peck and Shaw) can be gleened 
from a number of sources and the surrounding circumstances should 
be considered. 
" However, the intention to annex 
may be and of ten is inferred from the 
circumstances surrounding the 
annexation, adaption and usage of the 
article." Stockton vs. Tester, 273 
SW2d 783 at 787. Mo. (1954). 
The following circumstances are persuasive. The air 
conditioning units were installed in October of 1977. By its 
own terms, the lease would have run, barring the default of 
Peck and Shaw, for approximately another nine (9) years before 
the lease would have been subject to renegotiation by Mani vest~. 
It can hardly be doubted that Peck and Shaw, given the expense 
and adequacy of the new system, wanted to use it for at least 
the remaining nine years of its lease and perhaps longer if a 
new lease could be renegotiated. It is clear that Peck and 
Shaw must have desired to use both systems during the entire 
tenancy of the leasehold and to maintain it as a permanent 
accession thereto. It is clear from the acts of Peck and Shaw 
when the equipment was installed, as annexor they intended 
the equipment to remain in place on a permanent basis. For 
instance, roofs are expensive to maintain and repair yet large 
holes were cut in the roof and the walls to accomodate the 
systems. It is obvious that Peck and Shaw did not have in mind 
only a short term and detachable usage for the equipment. The Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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units were intended to remain in place until obsolescent so 
as to justify the initial installation expense of retrofitting 
the building. In a Massachusettes case entitled General Heat 
and Appliance vs. Goodwin, the Court stated: 
"The central heating plant of a dwelling house 
is not a piece of furniture. Successive tenants 
do not bring it with them when they become 
occupants, nor take it away with them when they 
cease to occupy the building. It remains, and in 
the ordinary course of events, performs its 
function of heating until it wears out or is 
otherwise rendered insufficient or useless. It 
relates to the building itself. Its presence 
has a distinct relation to the value of the 
premises for the purpose of sale or mortgage." 
54 NE 2d 676 at 679 (Massachusettes, 1944). 
Heating and cooling equipment in and of themselves manifest an 
intent of permanency. 
Furthermore, the evidence adduced at trial showed the 
Defendant required of its tenant that the air conditioning and 
heating system be maintained by the tenant. To this effect, 
witness Dobson stated as follows: 
"A .. I said that we would not sign a waiver, 
we would take it for consideration, but 
I did not think we would sign the waiver. 
Q Fer what reason. 
A Because our tenant had a responsibility to 
maintain the equipment that was in the 
facility, and it was his responsibility to 
do so. I didn't feel that we would sign it 
on that basis." (Record p.218). 
From the preceding example, the annexor, Peck and Shaw, was of 
the intention to have the equipment remain on the premises as a 
permanent accession to the leasehold. 
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POINT III 
IR.THE CASE AT BAR THE LANDLOR.r 
SHOULD RETAIN THOSE ITEMS DEEMED 
FIXTURES AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
Regarding the leased equipment in questions, title never 
passed from the lessor to the lessee. The Plaintiff did retain 
title. However, the Plaintiff was well aware that the 
equipment was likely to assume the character and posture of fix-
tures for which the landlord may have an interest. Were this not 
so, Plaintiff would have had no reason to request Defendant to 
execute a landlord waiver (Record p. 111). In light of this 
fact, the rule is stated as follows: 
" There is authority that where the ·conditional 
seller or chattel mortgagee knows at the time of 
the sale or mortgage that the object upon which he 
depends for security is intended for permanent 
incorporation in and affixation to realty not owned 
by his buyer or mortgagor, his rights will ordinarily 
be held subservient to those of the owner of the 
realty." 35 AM JUR 2d §70 Fixtures 
The record is clear that the Plaintiff was well aware of the 
''to be installed' nature of the equipment. If fact, Plaintiff's 




Is there any particualar custom in the trade of 
General Leasing obtaining landlord's waivers 
before installation of equipment? 
Well, as general practice we usually do obtain 
waivers, but it depends sometimes on each 
individual case exactly how we go about to get 
one, and when and how. 
Q Are you saying then that sometimes you don't 
--.-~:-: "~:,~, ~,:-~ivers, but go ahead and install 
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A Well, I guess.about the last year it's been 
mandatory. Now we do it as a regular practice. 
We did before, but we sometimes made exceptions, 
due to a person's reputation or credit file. 
We would sometimes perhaps not be as aggressive 
all the way through it. 
Q Did you attempt to get a waiver from Manivest 
in this case? 
A Yes, sir, we did. 
Q About when, do you recall? 
A At the inception of the lease. 
Q Before installation? 
A Well, we told Mr. Peck that we would not give 
him the money unless we had a waiver, because 
this was going to be installed, and when the 
eguipment is installed we get a little 
nervous and make sure they know when it is 
going in that we have to have this document." 
(Record p. 170). (emphasis ours) 
From this and from the nature of the property itself, it 
is clear that Plaintiff knew of the intended use of the equipment. 
Furthermore, the record gives no indication that Defendant was 
given any notice by the Plaintiff that the equipment was going 
to be installed. The record seems to indicate the equipment was 
installed first--then when the· lease began, Manivest was approached 
for a landlord waiver (Record p. 170). 
" Where personality, such as machinery, is to 
the seller's knowledge sold to be attached to 
the realty of a third person other than the buyer 
and used for a particular purpose, in order to bind 
such third person by a contract of conditional sale 
between the buyer and seller, such as one reserving 
title in the seller until full payment, such third 
person must have the actual notice of the reserved 
title, and its rights are not affected by the 
contract for payment between the buyer and seller 
without such notice." Allis-r'h!:21 ma.,..'"' .. ,.,,..___ ,.,~ ~--
of Atlantic, 144 NW 346 (see · ---Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Common sense also plays a role in the determination of 
fixture cases. l\Then items of personal property. become too 
related to the value of the building that removal constitutes 
material injury, they are and should be fixtures. Regarding the 
damage which would occur to the building should the heating 
equipment and air conditioners be removed, one must reason as 
did a New Yersey Court in the case of Ltnnpkin vs. Holland 
Furnace Company: 
"A heating plant in a dwelling house 
in this climate is as essential as doors 
and windows. While the latter may be 
removed from their hinges without doing 
material injury to the remainder of the 
building, in a purely physical sense, yet 
depriving a dwelling of all means of 
excluding cold on the one hand and pro-
viding warmth on the other, cannot be 
contemplated without recognizing 
material injury as a result." 178 
A 788 at 789-790 New Jersey (1935). 
Material injury to the freehold is and must be an overiding 
concern--even though the subject property is leased and title 
thereto is in the. hands of another. This is the conclusion 
of a growing number of Courts in various jurisdictions. 
" Another point raised by the appellant's 
is that the testimony of Robert L. Tester, 
one of the defendants, regarding the 
agreement with the tenant that certain 
property should remain with the building, 
was so contradictory that it had no probative 
value. 
We think the testimony of Tester in respect 
to such claimed agreement was not and is not 
the determining factor on the question as to 
whether the articles had been annexed to and 
become a part of the freehold. The elements 
in making such detennination are usually said 
to be those of Annexation, Adaption and Intent. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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As between landlord and tenant and where 
the rights of third parties do not intervene, 
the intent is of p~ramount · importance. But 
as between the owner of the building and 
creditors of the lessee it is of only 
coincidental importance and the question must 
be determined with more emphasis on the 
character of annexation and the uses to 
which the property is put. Stockton v. 
Tester, 273 SW2d 783 at 786,787 Mo. (1954). 
Furthermore, in this case the lease had already been terminated 
with Peck and Shaw and Manivest had retaken control. In that 
regard, Plaintiff's right to retake the equipment had also been 
lost. 
"It is evident that there are circumstances 
under which the rights of the landlord will pre-
vail as against a conditional seller or chattel 
mortgagee, principally where removal of the 
disputed object would result in material injury 
to the freehold, but also where the chattel was 
mortgaged after its annexation to the realty. 
It would also appear to be the rule that if the 
tenant, by reason either of nonpayment of rent or 
termination of the tenancy, or for other causes, 
loses the right to remove the fixtures in 
question, such right will also be lost to his 
conditional seller or chattel mortgagee." 
35 AM JUR 2d Fixtures § 69. 
In this wise~ since the Plaintiff proceeded ahead without 
timely prior notice to Defendant and installed equipment on a 
long term lease with Peck and Shaw --their right to the equipment 
after the Peck and Shaw abandonment-- is no better than Peck and 
Shaw's would have been after abandonment. This point is well 
settled. 
" Respondent asserts, and we think correctly, 
that the chattel mortgagee can get no greater 
rights than those possessed by the tenant-
mortgagor. The ·rule was well expressed in 
Donahue v. Hardman Estate, 91 Wash. 125, 157 
P. 478, at page 480, 'A mortgagee from a tenant 
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has no greater right to remove trade fixtures 
from the premises after the tenant has surrendered 
possession to the landlord than the tenant 
himself would have. Whatever right or title 
the mortgagee from the tenant may have cannot 
rise higher than its source, and is measured 
by what the rights of the tenant would be at the 
time the mortgagee asserts his claim.' To the 
same effect are: Couch v. Scandinavian-American 
Bank, 103 Or.48, 197 P. 284, ... (other remaining 
cites deleted). 
Appellants assert that the rule in California 
is otherwise and that the lien of a chattel mortage 
is superior to the landowner's title even though 
the tenant-.mortgagor may have forfeited' his right 
of removal by failure to exercise it within a 
reasonable time. They rely however on cases where 
the lien attached before the article was affixed 
to the realty. The distinction is clearly pointed 
out in Martyn v. Hamilton, 62 N.D. 445, 244 N.W. 15, 
17: 'A mortgage taken with knowledge of the 
landlord's rights and that the machinery involved 
is a fixture is entirely different from a case 
where the landlord permitted mortgaged machinery 
to be affixed to his building.'" United Pacific 
Insurance Co. v. Gann, 276 P.2d 858 at 861, Cal. 
(1954). See also Glaser v. North, 201 Or 118, 
266 P.2d 680. 
Since Plaintiff was asleep at the switch when it could have 
accelerated its lease with the lessee, and allowed the Peck and 
Shaw abandonment ,without procuring their property, they find 
themselves in the difficult position of trying to assert a right 
they do not have. 
CONCLUSION 
·The parties'· actions ·and the legal consequences indicate that 
G'eneral,Leasing 'Company· has nO cause of action~ The record 
indicates the· following: (1) General Leasing Company allowed 
a. permanently-installed air conditioning system and heating system 
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be installed without notice to or waiver from the Defendant, 
Manivest Corporation; (2) the air conditioning and heating 
system together with its duct work constituted an entire system 
which should not be broken up due to the continuum nature of 
the fixtures; and (3) the property was sufficiently attached, 
intended, and adapted as fixture. Furthermore, none of the 
subject equipment can be removed without material injury to the 
realty. 
Therefore, the judgment as entered should be vacated and 
Plaintiff's claims as to the subject equipment should be found 
lacking as a matter of law. 
DATED this 9'th day of July, 1982. 
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